

[بحث مستخرج من مجلة كلية الآداب ، المجلد الخامس الجزء الأول]

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في الفلسفة والعلم الإلهي

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القاهرة

مطبعة المعهد العلمي الفرنسي للآثار الشرقية

١٩٣٩

MAIMONIDES AGAINST GALEN, ON PHILOSOPHY AND COSMOGONY

BY

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INTRODUCTION.

In a former publication of the Faculty of Arts of the Egyptian University we have furnished some documents on the survival of Greek learning among the Arabs, connected with the famous controversy between two eminent physicians, a Christian of Baghdad and a Muslim of Cairo, during the middle of the Vth/XIth cent.⁽¹⁾ This kind of learning still continued during the next two centuries, in spite of the political and economical decay of most countries of the Islamic world, and in spite of the decline of the intellectual level of the higher classes of society. But religious hatred, inflamed partly by two centuries of struggles between the Crusaders and the Muslims of the Near East, contributed to the slow destruction of independent studies to which the Mongol and Turkish invasions dealt the final blow. During the VIth/XIIth cent., however, Greek learning was still in full swing, and several capitals of Islamic states produced scores of students proficient in different branches of knowledge. We mention from East to West only the following: in Persia, the celebrated philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī; the two mystics Yaḥyā and 'Omar al-Suhrawardī who were learned in Greek philosophy, but fought it in many treatises; the physician Zayn al-Dīn Ismā'īl al-Jurjānī, author of an enormous Persian encyclopædia of medicine (*Dhakhira-i-Khwārizm-shāhī*); and the astronomer al-Khāzinī. In Baghdad, the astronomer

⁽¹⁾ J. SCHACHT and M. MEYERHOF, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy between Ibn Buṭlān of Baghdad and Ibn Ridwān of Cairo*, etc. Cairo 1937.

Baḍī' al-zamān al-Aṣṭurlābī; the physicians Ibn al-Talmīdh (Christian) and Abū'l-Barakāt Hibatallāh (Jew); the alchemist al-Ṭughrā'ī and others. In Syria, the physician Ibn al-Maṭrān, whose pupils carried on the tradition of Hippocratic and Galenic learning during the following (VIIIth/XIIIth) cent. In Egypt, under the last Fatimide Caliphs and the first Aiyubide Sultans, particularly the great Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin), medical studies flourished, and the first great hospital was erected in Cairo. The outstanding figure of this period was Maimonides of whom we have to speak hereafter. In Sicily, the prince and Sharīf Muḥammad al-Idrīsī acquired immortal fame by his two great geographical works which he created at the request of the Norman Kings Roger and William, based on Ptolemy's Geography, but far surpassing it. In Spain, the number of men of classical learning was particularly great during this fertile century: Ibn Jubayr enriched geographical knowledge by careful description of his travels; Ibn Aflāḥ of Seville was the best astronomer of his time; he ventured to criticize Ptolemy's astronomical views, and wrote an important chapter on trigonometry; his successor al-Bitrūjī continued the struggle against the Ptolemaic system, but accepted Aristotle's cosmological opinions. The philosophers Ibn Bājjā (Avempace), Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) are world-famed and exercised a lasting influence on western mediæval thought. The medical men Ibn Zuhīr (Avenzoar), his relatives, and Abū'l-Ṣalt Umayya, the latter at the same time a talented poet, musician and mathematician, stand beside learned naturalists like Aḥmad al-Ghāfiqī, author of a botanical pharmacopœia, and Ibn al-'Awwām who created the best book on agriculture—referring to Spain only—which has been written in the Middle Ages. All their writings are based on a profound knowledge of the works of Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen and their Greek commentators whose output was accessible to them almost in its whole extent in good Arabic translations.

Moses Maimonides (latinized for Mōshê ben Maymôn, in Arabic Mūsā ibn 'Ubaydallāh) was born in Cordova in 1134 A. D., but had to leave his native town in 1148 on account of religious persecution. He led an errant life with his family, settled down for some time in Fez (Morocco) and emigrated to Egypt in 1165. Egypt was then, as to-day, the most liberal country of the Islamic world, under the rule of the last Fatimids as well as under that of Saladin. Afflicted by the successive deaths of

his father and of his younger brother who was the support of the family by his trade in precious stones, Maimonides fell ill, but recovered about 1168 and set out to earn a living for his family by medical practice in the Jewish quarter of Fustât (the southern district of Great Cairo). He very soon attracted the attention of the Qâdî al-Fâdîl ("Excellent Judge") 'Abdarrâhîm ibn 'Alî al-Baysânî who recommended him as one of the private physicians to the court of al-'Âdîd, the last Fatimid Caliph of Egypt. When this ruler was deposed by Saladin in 1171, the Qâdî became the latter's adviser and introduced Maimonides to his court. From this time onwards he won a universal reputation as a theologian, philosopher and physician, the effects of which became "tremendous and far-reaching in space and time"⁽¹⁾. This was due to the impressing personality of the scholar as a teacher and a medical man and at the same time to the importance of his scientific output. We do not know any details about his studies in his early years. He was a pupil of his father, a religious judge (*dayyân*) of the Jewish community of Cordova, and probably of the Rabbi Ben Shôshan in Fez. He says in his books that he had intercourse with the sons and pupils of Ibn Rushd, Ibn Aflah and Ibn Bâjja, and that he studied astronomy. Anyhow, when he arrived in Egypt he had already a perfect knowledge of the Græco-Arabic philosophy, astronomy, mathematics and medicine. In this latter branch he tried to read as many books as possible, as he himself relates in one of his letters. It is in Egypt, probably, that he became acquainted with the medical works of Ibn Ridwân who had died about a century before Maimonides' arrival in Cairo⁽²⁾. Besides this distinguished physician he quotes in the first line the great Persian physicians and philosophers al-Râzî (Rhazes) and Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna) and then many of the famous Hispano-Moorish physicians : Ibn Wâfid, al-Tamîmî, Ibn Samajûn and Ibn Janâh (all of the Vth/XIth cent., the latter a Jew and a valued grammarian of Hebrew), Ibn Zuhri, Ibn Bâjja and Aḥmad al-Ghâfiqî.

Apart from his rabbinical commentaries, some of which are written

⁽¹⁾ GEORGE SARTON, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. II (Baltimore 1931), p. 375.

⁽²⁾ See our book cited p. 53, note 1, particularly the biography of Ibn Ridwân, pp. 33-51.

in Hebrew, Maimonides used to write in Arabic. In this language he composed in his youth a treatise on the art of logic (in 1151) and another one on the Jewish calendar (in 1158), and he wrote in Arabic too, from 1187 to 1190, his famous letters to friends and communities in Egypt, Syria, Arabia and France. His greatest and most celebrated philosophical work, *Dalālat al-Hā'irīn* ("The Guide for the Perplexed"), is also written in Arabic; but it was very soon translated into Hebrew under the title of *Môrê Nevûkhîm*. This work gave an enormous stimulus to philosophical studies, partly by its own merit and partly by the passionate controversies which it raised among Jewish thinkers for several centuries. It helped greatly to check mysticism and rabbinical obscurantism. About 1190 Maimonides had acquired such a reputation as a physician, theologian and philosopher that he had hardly time for studies, and in 1198 he was appointed chief physician at the court of the Sultān al-Afdal Nûr al-Dīn 'Alī, a son and one of the successors of Saladin. The great scholar bitterly complains in his letters to his pupil Ibn 'Aqnīn and to the Rabbi Ibn Tibbōn in France⁽¹⁾ of being overburdened with medical work at the court of Cairo and in his private practice. When the Sultan was deposed in 1200, Maimonides' health had already seriously suffered, and he died in December 1204. In conformity with his will he was buried in Tiberias in Palestine, where his tomb is still to-day a place of veneration to the Jews of the entire world.

As to Maimonides' medical works, one of us has already given an account of them⁽²⁾ so that there is no need for a new enumeration. Maimonides wrote altogether ten treatises on medical subjects which are nearly all extant in manuscripts in the original Arabic, and some of them in Hebrew and old Latin translations; part of them have been printed during the XVth and XVIth cent. Three of these books are compilations

⁽¹⁾ See S. MUNK, *Notice sur Joseph ben Iehouda . . . disciple de Maimonide*, in : *Journal Asiatique* 1842, vol. XIV, pp. 5-17.

⁽²⁾ M. MEYERHOF, *L'œuvre médicale de Maimonide*, in : *Archivio di Storia della Scienza (Archeion)*, vol. XI (Rome 1929), pp. 136-155. See, moreover, Giuseppe GABRIELI, *Maimonide* (based on Arabic sources), in : *Archeion*, vol. V (1924), pp. 12-15, and G. SARTON, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. II (Baltimore 1931), pp. 369-380.

from the works of the two great Greek physicians; they are : extracts from Galen's works, a commentary on Hippocrates' *Aphorisms*, and Maimonides' own *Medical Aphorisms* of which we are going to speak in detail below. The seven original works of Maimonides are treatises *On Sexual Intercourse*, *On Asthma*, *On Hæmorrhoids*, *On Poisons*, all written at the request of princes or nobles. Further two hygienic treatises composed for the Sultan Nûr al-Dîn 'Alî during his short reign; this ruler suffered from fits of melancholic depression, and Maimonides gave him, at the end of the XIIth cent., detailed advice about diet and exercise. Most of these treatises have been published in Arabic with German translations by the late Dr. Kroner (see the bibliography in the essay cited in the preceding note). Only recently has come to light a glossary of names of drugs with short descriptions, a curious example of "medical philology"; it seems to exist in only one MS in Istanbul⁽¹⁾.

Although leading in philosophy and theology, Maimonides followed in medicine the beaten path, *i. e.* the prescripts of the Greek physicians with their Arabic modifications. Unlike the greatest Persian clinician Muḥammad ibn Zakariyâ' al-Râzî (Rhazes, d. 925 A. D.), Maimonides was no very independent thinker—these being indeed extremely rare in Arabic medical literature. Maimonides was inclined to accept and to follow the rules laid down by Galen, whose system held unshaken authority during the Middle Ages and part of the Modern Age in the Orient as well as in the Occident. Nevertheless, Maimonides showed some independent thought in medicine in his two treatises written for Sultan Nûr al-Dîn 'Alî, especially when he established ethical rules for the behaviour of his exalted patient. In another of his works he even ventured to apply a severe criticism to Galen's doctrines; this is in the last part of his *Medical Aphorisms* of which we have to treat immediately. We have shown in our afore-mentioned publication⁽²⁾ that Ibn Riḍwân of Cairo did

⁽¹⁾ M. MEYERHOF, *Sur un glossaire de matière médicale arabe composé par Maimonide*, in : *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte*, t. XVII (Cairo 1935), pp. 223-235; and the edition which is now in the press : M. MEYERHOF, *Sharḥ Asmā' al-'Uqqār, un glossaire de matière médicale arabe composé par Maimonide. Mém. Inst. d'Égypte*, t. XLI, Le Caire 1939.

⁽²⁾ See pp. 20 ff., especially p. 24.

not allow any of his followers to depart in the least from the Galenic system and that his prescriptions for medical learning were entirely based on the study of Galen's books. Even when he found contradictions he endeavoured to show that Galen, in judging the value of remedies and aliments, had made provision for the differences of the various cases, as when he says in the fourth book of his *Simple Drugs* that whey is of "cold and moist" temperament, while he says in the second book of his *On Aliments* that it is "hot and dry". It is quite possible that this passage of Ibn Ridwân's *On Medical Learning* provoked Maimonides to his criticism of Galen⁽¹⁾.

The *Medical Aphorisms*, the most voluminous of Maimonides' medical writings, were written by him probably towards the end of his life, in Arabic, as a collection of short medical sentences taken mostly from Galen, more rarely from later physicians, and he declares expressly that he had collected them from Galen's works for himself, adding sometimes his own opinions or explanations. The title of the book is in Arabic *Fuṣūl Mūsā fi'l-Tibb* ("Moses' Aphorisms on Medicine") or *Fuṣūl al-Qurtubī* ("Aphorisms of the man of Cordova"); it has been translated into Hebrew by Zerahyâ ben Yiṣḥâq ben Shealtiel in Rome in 1277, and soon afterwards a second time, equally in Rome, by Natan ha-Meati⁽²⁾; a Latin translation from the Arabic text was made probably during the XIIIth cent.⁽³⁾ and printed under the title *Aphorismi excellentissimi Rabbi Moyses secundum doctrinam Galeni* etc. in Bologna in 1489⁽⁴⁾ and in Venice in 1497 and 1500, and later. Arabic and Hebrew MSS of this work are not rare. The Hebrew text was printed, in a very inadequate manner, in Lemberg (Lwów, Poland) in 1834-35 and in Wilna in 1888. The Arabic text is still unedited. Only the Introduction and six fragments concerning

⁽¹⁾ It is a curious coincidence that the Arabic root 'ṭb in its application to intellectual and moral weakness occurs both in Ibn Ridwân (p. 47, No. 85) and in Maimonides (fol. 261 b at the top).

⁽²⁾ M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Die hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters*, Berlin 1893, pp. 765-767.

⁽³⁾ M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Die europæischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in : *Sitzungsber. d. Kaiserl. Akademie der Wissensch. zu Wien*, vol. 151 (Vienna 1905), p. 33.

⁽⁴⁾ L. CHOULANT, *Handbuch der Bücherkunde für die ältere Medicin*, Leipzig 1841, p. 379.

passages of the commentary of Galen on Plato's *Timæus* have been printed in Arabic with a German translation and a description of the Gotha and Leiden MSS by Paul Kahle⁽¹⁾. By far the best of the five known MSS⁽²⁾ is that preserved in the library of Gotha, No. 1937⁽³⁾. This MS is copied from a copy from the original redaction of the work by Maimonides' nephew Abu'l-Ma'ânî Yûsuf ibn 'Abdallâh who says at the end of the twenty-fourth and the twenty-fifth *maqâla*'s (discourses or treatises) of the book that the master himself had collected his notes and put them in order for copy; that the neat copy of the first twenty-four discourses had been made by Abu'l-Ma'ânî under the supervision of his uncle, but that Maimonides could not finish the arrangement of the last discourse which was put in order by Abu'l-Ma'ânî himself after the death of his uncle (December 1204); and that the neat copy of the twenty-fifth discourse was finished by the young editor in the beginning of the year 602 A. H. (= August 1205).

Each discourse of the book is divided into numerous (but not numbered) chapters or sections (*fasl*) each of which contains an aphorism, followed by the indication of the work of Galen from which it is extracted. We cite as an example the last Chapter of book 23 (at the foot of fol. 232 a of the Gotha MS): "The diseases which are called endemic (*baladîya*) are those proper to the majority of the population of the country in question. They occur either in a known season or they are of frequent occurrence in every season, and this according to the general conditions of air and water in the country and to the alimentation of its population. (Said by Galen) in his commentary on the first (book of Hippocrates') *Airs and Waters*". The discourses 1-3 concern anatomy, physiology and general pathology, 4-6 semeiology (pulse and urine), 7-14 etiology,

⁽¹⁾ *Mosis Maimonidis Aphorismorum Præfatio et Excerpta*, Appendix II to : H. O. SCHROEDER, *Galenî in Platonis Timæum Commentarii Fragmenta*, Leipzig and Berlin 1934, pp. 89-99.

⁽²⁾ BROCKELMANN, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, vol. I (Weimar 1898), p. 490, and *Supplement*, vol. I (Leiden 1937), p. 894.

⁽³⁾ We have used it in a photographic reproduction belonging to the Jewish Theological Seminary of America (New York) and kindly lent by this institution to M. Meyerhof. The MS has been written in the middle of the XIIIth cent.

doctrine of fevers and crises, venesection, purgatives and emetics, 15 surgery, 16 gynæcology, 17 hygiene, 18-20 diet, exercise and baths, 21-22 pharmacopœia, 23 the explanation of obscure names and conceptions in Galen's works, and 24 consists of a collection of rare and interesting cases out of Galen's writings⁽¹⁾. In all these twenty-four books Maimonides exhibits an astonishing knowledge of the enormous medical output of the great Greek physician; and he is, indeed, an excellent guide through the basic ideas of Galen for students of history of medicine.

By far the most voluminous and important discourse of Maimonides' *Aphorisms* is the last (25th), because the author gives in its (42) chapters a criticism of Galen which is not at all common during the Middle Ages. Maimonides not only accuses Galen of more than forty contradictions in his works—which is no wonder in such a voluminous writer—but he charges him with ignorance in philosophical matters. Galen had been severely criticised by the great Muslim physician al-Râzî (Rhazes), but Ibn Ridwân had taken up the defence of the Greek physician and accused in his turn al-Râzî to be an ignorant man⁽²⁾. It may be that this polemic, together with Ibn Ridwân's harmonising tendency in interpreting Galen, suggested to Maimonides a systematic search for contradictions in Galen's works. What particularly excited Maimonides against the so highly venerated Galen, are the latter's remarks against the Biblical cosmogony, in a passage occurring in Galen's famous book *De Usu Partium Corporis Humani* ("On the Utility of the Parts of the Human Body"). In this work Galen established his teleological system which was destined to meet the approval of eastern and western theologians and to dominate the medical thought down to the XVIIth cent. Although he was the first and foremost contributor to experimental physiology he subordinated the results of his experiences to philosophical speculation in which he was educated by ample study of Aristotle's works. He developed, in *De Usu Partium*, with enthusiasm the central idea that every thing in nature shows an element of design and the goodness of the Creator⁽³⁾, following pro-

⁽¹⁾ Dr. J. Pagel gave a short analysis of the Latin translation of the *Aphorisms* in J. GUTTMANN, *Moses ben Maimon*, vol. I (Leipzig 1908), pp. 232-238.

⁽²⁾ See our repeatedly quoted book, pp. 26 foll.

⁽³⁾ See F. H. GARRISON, *An Introduction to the History of Medicine*, 4th ed., Philadelphia and London 1929, p. 116.

bably Aristotle's idea that "nature makes nothing in vain". This subjective teleology caused Galen to speak in the eleventh book of *De Usu Partium*⁽¹⁾ of the creation of the eye-brows and the eye-lashes and the reason why they never grow long; this gives him an occasion for a digression on creation and cosmogony in which he opposes the thought of Greek philosophy to that of Moses in the Bible. It was perhaps only to show his universal erudition, including knowledge of the Greek Bible (the Septuagints), that Galen made these remarks. But as he alluded to the person of the Prophet Moses who occupied, with prophetism in general, one of the highest places in Maimonides' creed, the latter wrote in the 25th discourse of his *Aphorisms* a very long chapter (the 40th) against Galen's conceptions. This chapter is, in our opinion, the most interesting in the last discourse of the *Aphorisms*, and we therefore made up our minds to publish its Arabic text with a literal translation. Maimonides had already expressed the same ideas, sometimes even with identical words, in his *Guide for the Perplexed*; in this book we find also a strong diatribe against Galen's defective understanding in philosophical matters⁽²⁾, e. g. as regards the significance of the notion "time". In part II, chapter 13 of the *Guide* Maimonides explains the three theories concerning the question of the eternity of the universe. The first is that of "those who follow the law of Moses our teacher": God exists from eternity and has created the universe from nothing. The second is that of the philosophers: God cannot create a thing from nothing or reduce a thing to nothing; there was a certain matter coexistent with God from eternity, and God created the world from it. The third theory is that of Aristotle and his followers who hold the same view, but go further by believing that the universe itself is eternal and indestructible, built from a *materia prima* which is itself eternal, merely changing forms; nothing is produced contrary to the laws of the ordinary course of nature. Maimonides

⁽¹⁾ *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, ed. C. G. Kuehn, vol. III (Leipzig 1822), pp. 904-907; and *Galen de Usu Partium Libri XVII*, ed. C. Helmreich, vol. II (Leipzig 1909), pp. 158-159. French translation by Ch. DAREMBERG, *Oeuvres anatomiques, physiologiques et médicales de Galien*, t. I (Paris 1854), p. 687-88.

⁽²⁾ *The Guide for the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides*, translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedländer, 2nd ed., London 1910, p. 171.

then cites, in chapter 14, the philosophical arguments in favour of Aristotle's hypothesis, and attacks and invalidates it thereafter in a series of chapters by his own argumentation based on the Scripture and the Prophets. We shall meet similar ideas in our text.

It should be noted that Galen was not very much appreciated as a philosopher, even by the Hellenistic commentators of Aristotle's works, and still less so by the great philosophers of Islam⁽¹⁾. Abû Naṣr al-Fârâbî (d. 950 A.D.), the greatest early exponent of Aristotle's works in Arabic, criticised Galen's philosophy, and Maimonides quotes in this chapter 40 which we are translating in the following pages, two passages from the great commentary of al-Fârâbî (now lost) on the *Analytica Posteriora*; Steinschneider found these quotations important enough to incorporate them in his well-known treatise on al-Fârâbî⁽²⁾. Likewise the famous Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna), in his great philosophical encyclopædia *Kitâb al-Shifâ'* ("Book of Healing") attacks in different places the opinions of Galen, e.g. concerning syllogisms⁽³⁾. The third prominent philosopher of Islam, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), equally refuted in several of his works Galen's ideas. (But as Averroes lived in far-away Spain where he died in 1198, his works came very late to the knowledge of Maimonides)⁽⁴⁾. So Maimonides' attack on Galen must not be considered as an isolated instance; it is of interest to see how he discerned in his usual sharp critical manner between the great physician and the less great philosopher.

This chapter 40 of discourse 25 has never been entirely translated into a modern language. Steinschneider has published the Hebrew text of this chapter (which he numbers 42) from two MSS of Zerahyâ's translation⁽⁵⁾; this text is much better than that of the defective Lemberg

⁽¹⁾ See IBRAHIM MADKOUR, *L'organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, Paris 1934, pp. 206-207, 211, etc.

⁽²⁾ M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Al-Fârâbî (Alpharabius) des arabischen Philosophen Leben und Schriften*, St.-Petersburg 1869, pp. 34 ff.

⁽³⁾ See IBRAHIM MADKOUR, *l. c.* See also the same author's *La place d'al-Fârâbî dans la philosophie musulmane*, Paris 1934, Introduction.

⁽⁴⁾ See a passage from Maimonides' letter to Ibn 'Aqnîn in S. Munk, in the publication cited p. 56, n. 1.

⁽⁵⁾ M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Al-Fârâbî* (see the third preceeding note).

edition. Although the Hebrew translation contains a number of errors, it has served us for comparison with and for better understanding of some passages in the Arabic text.

We are greatly indebted to Miss D. Ginger and Miss E. Perkins for the careful revision of the English text.

TRANSLATION.

(fol. 239 b) In the name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful!

My Lord, help!

The twenty-fifth Discourse : it contains chapters about some doubts which arose to me concerning the words of Galen.

Says Mûsâ : In (exposing) these doubts which I am going to mention I do not intend to pursue the same aim as al-Râzî, as will become evident to the attentive reader, because al-Râzî did not establish his doubts, but began to refute him (at once) in matters which have no relationship whatever to the medical art; and even in matters which are pertaining to the medical art he did not well establish his doubts against him in his deductions; it is evident that this is not a logical argument, and he has only established his own shortcomings in the art of logic. He often blames him, moreover, and ascribes to him conclusions derived from the absolute and literal sense of his words, without regard to the sense in which he uses them in the context. Ibn Zuh'r and Ibn Ridwân have tried to remove those doubts. I do not pretend to this intention in anything, and I will not say anything on those points which he (al-Râzî) pretends to be doubts or to be solutions of doubts; for all this is, in my opinion, useless waste (fol. 240 a) of time, nay, waste of time for the worse, because every obstinacy means in most cases to follow preconceived ideas, and every following of preconceived ideas is a sheer evil. I am going to mention the doubts which befell me on account of his (Galen's) words in matters related to the medical science, as he is the chief of this science and has to be followed in it; but his opinions ought to be followed only in medicine and in nothing else. That these doubts befell me can only result from one of three causes : firstly it may come from a mistake which befell those who translated the books into the language of the Arabs; or

it may come from a blunder which happened to Galen, as nobody is exempt by his high rank from these pardonable things; or the cause may be my bad understanding. Anyhow, it cannot be but useful that I gather and expose both contradictory opinions, so that the subject of the doubt may become evident, that the attentive reader may direct his interest to this point, and that the truth on which he can rely may become manifest to him and his notions may not be deranged and he may not become confused, if a similar doubt presents itself to him.

(fol. 260 b) CHAPTER (40). Says Mūsā : It is well known that the philosophers say that the soul can be healthy or diseased, exactly as the body can be healthy or diseased; those diseases and that health of the soul which they mean, appear in opinions and morals, and these are doubtless proper to mankind. Therefore I call wrong opinions and bad morals with all their different kinds (specifically) human diseases; to these human diseases belongs a disease which is so common that hardly a single individual in (entire) long periods can escape it. This disease can be more or less severe in man like the other diseases of body and soul. This disease which I mean is that every single individual imagines himself to be more perfect than he (really) is, and that he goes further and wishes that all his opinions may possess perfection without fatigue and exertion. On account of this common disease we find that individuals who possess cleverness and sagacity and who have learned one of the philosophical sciences, theoretical or practical, or one of the traditional sciences and have become efficient in that science, omit opinions (fol. 261 a) not only in that science which they have mastered, but also in other sciences which they do not know at all or in which they are deficient, and they put their opinions in those sciences on the same footing with their opinions in that science in which they have become efficient; especially if the individual in question has attained one of the alleged beatitudes (*i. e.* self-sufficiency), can consider himself to be the chief and the foremost and has become one of the great masters who has only to speak in order to make his words to be accepted, and whose opinions are never refuted. Whenever this alleged beatitude has become developed and strong, the disease in question gains a footing and becomes desperate, and this individual begins in due course to talk nonsense and to speak

what comes into his mind, according to his imagination or his (mental) disposition, or according to the questions which are addressed to him, so that he gives the answer which comes into his mind, because he does not want to acknowledge that there are things which he does not know. This disease has become so inveterate in some people that they are not content with all this, but begin to argue and to explain that these sciences which they do not know are useless and unnecessary, and that there is no science which deserves the effort of a lifetime, besides that science which he knows and none else, be it a philosophical or a traditional science; many have (even) composed refutations of sciences which they have not mastered. To sum up, this disease is very widespread (fol. 261 b) and if you look attentively and with an impartial eye at the words of an individual, the degree of severity of this disease will become evident to you and (you will be able to state) whether this individual is near to health or to weakness. There is Galen the physician, who has been attacked by this disease in the same degree as people who are his equal in science, viz. this man was very very efficient in medicine, more than anybody of whom we have heard or whose words we have seen; he has attained in anatomy an enormous success and he has found out—together with others in his time—things about the functions, uses and nature of the organs, and the conditions of the pulse which had not been known at the time of Aristotle. He, I mean Galen, has no doubt exercised himself in mathematics and has studied logic and the books of Aristotle on natural science and theology, but he is defective in all that. His excellent intelligence and his sagacity which he has directed towards medicine, and his discoveries of some of the conditions of the pulse, in anatomy and on the uses and functions (physiology)—which are doubtlessly, to be impartial, more correct than what Aristotle discusses in his books—have induced him to speak on things in which he is very much deficient and on which the specialists are in disagreement. So he has refuted Aristotle, as you know, in logic and speaks on theology and natural science. For instance, he speaks about the opinions which he has adopted (fol. 262 a) for himself⁽¹⁾ and speaks on motion, time, place and the

⁽¹⁾ This is an allusion to Galen's book *Peri tón heautó dokúntón*, one of his last writings. The Greek text is nearly totally lost, but the Arabs possessed the book

primum movens, and on all those subjects he emits opinions which are known to the people of that branch; finally, he has composed his famous book *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* and the book *On Sperm* all of which contain refutations of Aristotle. Likewise he has composed his book *De Demonstratione* and pretended that the physician is not perfect in medicine unless he knows it, and that it is very useful to the physician; he has confined himself to those syllogisms which are necessary for demonstration, pretending that those syllogisms are useful in medicine and in other branches, and he has omitted the other (syllogisms). But the syllogisms which he has mentioned are not at all the demonstrative syllogisms, and he has omitted those syllogisms which are very useful in the medical science, and still pretends that there is no need of them at all and that Aristotle's and other people's study of them is waste of time. Abû Naşr al-Fârâbî has explained all that, viz. that he has omitted the hypothetical and the mixed syllogisms, has confined himself to the absolute syllogisms which are those relative to existence, and has not taken notice of the fact that demonstrative syllogisms are relative to necessity and not to existence, and that it is the hypothetical and the mixed syllogisms which are useful in medicine and in most sciences. Now, hear the text of Abû (fol. 262 b) Naşr on this subject. He says in his great commentary on the *Analytica* where he begins to explain the preliminary exposition which he (Aristotle) has made on the Possible and on the hypothetical syllogisms⁽¹⁾: “Says Abû Naşr: The question here is not as Galen the physician thinks, because he has mentioned in his book *De Demonstratione* that the study of the Possible and of the (hypothetical) syllogisms which depend on it is superfluous; Galen the physician should have been one of the foremost to study the hypothetical syllogisms, nay, he ought to have directed most of his attention in his book *De Demonstratione* to the hypothetical syllogisms; for he pretends that he has composed his book *De Demonstratione* in order that it might be useful in

which had been translated into Syriac by the famous translator Hunayn ibn Ishâq (d. 873 A. D.) and into Arabic by one of his pupils. See G. BERGSTRÄSSER, *Ueber die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Uebersetzungen*, Leipzig 1925, No. 113 (p. 46 of the Arabic text).

⁽¹⁾ *Analytica priora*, I, 1.

medicine; now, the syllogisms which the physician has to employ in the application of the medical art and the syllogisms which he has to use in order to recognise the hidden diseases and their causes in every one of his patients whom he wishes to cure, all those are hypothetical syllogisms, and there is no necessary syllogism among them but for exceptional cases which are rather outside of the medical art. So he ought to have spoken in his book *De Demonstratione* about the kinds of the hypothetical syllogisms alone and not of those related to existence; and if he has confined himself in his book to the kinds relating to existence in order to restrict himself (fol. 263 a) to those syllogisms which are useful for demonstration, then (one has to say that) the kinds relating to existence are not destined for demonstrations, because these are not made from this stuff but are made from the kinds relating to necessity only". End of the quotation from Abû Naṣr.

Where Aristotle begins to explain the syllogisms which are mixed from hypothetical and absolute ones⁽¹⁾, says Abû Naṣr in comment of his words the following : "This chapter is extremely useful and more useful than (the chapter of) the plain hypothetical ones, because all the practical sciences make use of this chapter, especially in establishing whether the single phenomena which are expected, are going to occur or not, in medicine, in agriculture, in navigation, in politics, in rhetorics, in general premises⁽²⁾ and in all the activities in which one is in need of prognostics; all that which is to be found in the book of Hippocrates the physician *On Prognostics* and in similar books resolves itself into these syllogisms." End of the quotation from Abû Naṣr; take good notice of it!

Still more astonishing than the words of this man, Galen, is the fact that he is prolix in his praise of logic in all his books and that he says that the drawback of the medical men his contemporaries, and the cause of their shortcomings, is their lack of acquaintance with logic, and that (fol. 263 b) the cause of his efficiency is his study of logic, and that he always endeavours to put into evidence the physician's need of logic, but that when he composed this book, he not only did not mention one single

⁽¹⁾ *Analytica priora*, I, 11.

⁽²⁾ See *Dictionary of the Technical Terms Used in the Sciences of the Mussalmans*, ed. A. Sprenger and W. Nassau-Lees (Bibliotheca Indica), vol. I, p. 748.

kind of the different species of the hypothetical and mixed syllogisms which alone are useful in medicine—apart from specialists—but also said that there is no need whatever for them. Nobody can doubt that Galen has studied the books of Aristotle on logic and has understood them better than other people who are inferior to him, but on account of that general disease about which we are speaking he imagined that the understanding of the art of logic and of the other theoretical sciences is like the knowledge of the medical art, and that his efficiency in all those sciences is like his efficiency in medicine. Therefore he exposed himself to all these errors.

He did not stop at this limit, but on account of his excessive conceit concerning his observations on some utilities of the organs he pretended to be a prophet and said that an angel came to him from God and taught him such and such (a thing) and ordered him such and such (an action)⁽¹⁾. If only he had stopped at this point and ranged himself among the bulk of the prophets and not contradicted them! But he did not do so; the wrong appreciation of his own value induced him to compare himself with Moses—peace be upon him!—and to attribute to himself perfection (fol. 264 a) and to Moses ignorance—God is elevated above the talk of the ignorant! Therefore I thought it appropriate to let you know the text of his own words—he who quotes unbelief is not an unbeliever—and to refute him; although it is not to be a (real) refutation of somebody who commits an enormity like this, as Moses is not to him what he is to us, the community of followers of Divine Laws; but I wish to explain in this my refutation (only) that the ignorance with which he is charging our prophet Moses does not attain to him, but that Galen is in reality the ignorant one. I intend to arrange my appreciation of both of them as if they were two learned men one of whom is more perfect than the other, and not as if I had to decide between the words of a great prophet and those of a medical practitioner, which would be the just procedure if the matter is looked into. I say : After Galen has begun to expose, in the eleventh book of *De Usu Partium*, the utility of the

⁽¹⁾ This is probably an allusion to Galen's *De Usu Partium* Book X Chapters 12 to 14, where the author repeatedly declares to have received in a dream the order from a Divinity to reveal the mechanism of the vision.

fact that the hair of the eyebrows does not grow long and hang down like the hair of the head, and the utility of the fact that the eyelashes are rigid and do not grow long, he continues with the following words⁽¹⁾ :

“We say : The Creator has ordered this hair to remain at all times at one and the same length and not to grow longer; the hair has complied with this order and obeyed it, without deviating (fol. 264 b) from what it had been ordered, be it out of consternation and fear of acting against the order of God, be it out of good behaviour and awe before God who has given this order, or be it that the hair itself knew that it was most indicated and appropriate to do so. This is the opinion of Moses about natural things, and I think this opinion to be better and more deserving to be adopted than that of Epicurus, except that the best is to refrain from both and to maintain that God is the principle of the creation of all created things, as Moses has said, but to maintain in addition to this the principle which resides in the matter from which they have been created. Our Creator has caused the eyelashes and eyebrows to be obliged to remain at one and the same length, because this is the most adequate and sound (thing); and because he knew that this hair ought to become so, he has placed under the lashes a hard body similar to a cartilage which is extending along the eyelid, and he has spread out under the hair of the eyebrows a hard skin adherent to the cartilage (*i. e.* the superficial fascia) of the eyebrows. And this because it would not have been sufficient in order to retain this hair in one and the same length, that the Creator should have wished it to be so; likewise, if he should wish to transform a stone instantly into a man without making the stone undergo the corresponding alteration, it would not be possible. The difference between the belief of Moses and our belief and that of Plato and the other Greeks (fol. 265 a) is the following : Moses claims that it is sufficient that God wishes to give shape and form to the matter in order to let it take shape and form instantly, and this because he believes that all things are possible with God, and that, if he wishes to create from dust a horse or a bull instantly, he can do so. But we do not accept this, but say : there are things which are impossible in them-

⁽¹⁾ See above, p. 61, n. 1.

selves, and these God never wishes to occur, but he wishes only possible things to occur, and among the possible things he only chooses the best and most adequate and excellent. Therefore, as it is adequate and sound that the eyelashes and eyebrows should always remain at the same length and in their original number, we do not say about this hair that God had wished it to be so and that it became instantly as God wished it to be; for, should God have wished the hair to be so one million times it would never have been so, if he had let it originate from a soft skin; if he had not planted the roots of the hairs in a hard body, they would not have remained erect and rigid in spite of all his preference. If this is so I say : God has accomplished two things : firstly (fol. 265 *b*) the choice of the best and soundest and most appropriate condition for what he was going to do; and secondly, the choice of the appropriate matter. Therefore, as it was most sound and good that the eyelashes should be erect and rigid and that they should remain at one and the same length and in equal number, he has made the planting-ground and centre of the hair in a hard body; if he had planted it in a soft body he would have been more ignorant than Moses and more ignorant than the chief of a weak army who laid the foundations of the walls of his town or fortress in soft ground which is submerged by water. Thus the fact that the eyebrows are always in the same condition comes from his choice of the (appropriate) matter.” End of the quotation from Galen.

Says Mûsâ : If a man with philosophical training who knows the basic rules of the Divine Laws known in our times looks at these words, the confusion of this man(’s spirit) becomes manifest to him; for his words on the whole are consistent neither according to the opinion of the followers of Divine Laws nor to the opinion of the philosophers; because the rules of both opinions are not well established and fixed with Galen, and because he talks on things the premises of which he does not understand, as I am going to explain to you now. For he has attributed to Moses in his words cited by me four opinions; one opinion (only) of the four (fol. 266 *a*) is (really) Moses’ opinion, and the three other opinions do not belong to Moses; but Galen, through his lack of an established and fixed knowledge of all things about which he is talking, except medicine, imagined that the four opinions which he has mentioned are (only) one. I wish to point out, moreover, that the one opinion which is the opinion of Moses

mentioned by Galen, is the necessary consequence of the principle and basic rule of his religious law and that of his ancestor Abraham. Therefore his words are neither confused nor contradictory, but their premises and consequences are firmly established. All these assertions which Galen has made for himself and which he pretends to be his creed, are not the consequence of his belief but what he says is the consequence of the belief of others. Therefore his words are confused and his conclusions are not in agreement with his principles. I will now begin to explain those four opinions which Galen ascribes to Moses in this context.

The first one is his saying that God has ordered the hair of the eyebrow not to grow long, and that it has complied with it; he says that this is the opinion of Moses on natural things; but this is (in reality) not the opinion of Moses, for, according to Moses, God gives orders and prohibitions only to intelligent beings.

The second opinion is his saying that Moses believes (fol. 266 b) that all things are possible to God; this, too, is not the opinion of Moses, but his opinion is that the power to do impossible things cannot be ascribed to God. Galen, on account of his misrepresentation, has not been aware of the point on which opinions differ; for there are things of which Moses says that they are possible and of which others say that they are impossible; this difference in the appreciation of these things is a necessary consequence of the difference in the principles. But Galen has not paid attention to this and does not know it, and only confuses things.

The third opinion is his saying that Moses believes that God, if he wished to create from dust instantly a horse or a bull, could do it. It is true that this is the opinion of Moses, and it is a necessary consequence of his first premise, as we are going to explain.

The fourth opinion is his saying that Moses believes that God does not choose the matter according to its suitability for that which he wishes to come into existence in a certain manner, *e. g.*, as he said, the choice of a cartilaginous body beneath the eyelashes; but Moses does not differ (in opinion) in this and similar cases; he has plainly stated that God does not do anything without purpose⁽¹⁾ and by chance, but that he creates

⁽¹⁾ Here Maimonides employs a Qur'ānic expression; see *Sūra* XXIII, 115.

very well with justice and equity all which he creates, as I have explained in my exposition on (fol. 267 *a*) the principles of religion.

From all this one knows with certainty that in the eye the iris is perforated for the purpose of vision, that the bones are hard and dry in order to furnish a solid support, and likewise all that exists in the bodies of living beings, nay, everything which exists at all. Therefore the prophets who followed Moses have said that God has made all which he has created with wisdom. Galen seems to have understood only this one of Moses' opinions, *i. e.* that a thing can arise instantly in a manner contrary to nature, like the transformation of the stick into a snake and of dust into lice. Therefore it is possible, according to him, that the dust may become instantly a horse or a bull; this is true and it is the opinion of Moses; all these are necessary consequences of the principles in which Moses believes, *i. e.* that the world has been created. For the meaning of the world being created is that God alone without anything beside him is the primordial and eternal, that he has produced the world after complete non-existence, and has brought into being this heaven and all which is in it, and the first matter which is below the heaven, that he has formed from it water, air, earth and fire, that he has shaped the celestial globe with its different spheres according to his will, and that he has shaped these elements and all that is composed of them with these different natures which we perceive, as He is the giver of forms by which they get (fol. 267 *b*) their nature. This is the principle of the doctrine of Moses.

As the first matter, according to him, has been brought into existence after non-existence and has been shaped into its forms, it is possible that God who has brought it into existence may destroy it again as well afterwards; likewise it is possible that he may change its nature and the nature of everything which is composed of it and may give it instantly a nature different from the regular one, as he has brought it into existence instantly. So, according to Moses, a change of condition in anything belonging to the natural world of generated and perishable things is possible, so that God possesses the power to effect it and can exert His will upon it : if God wishes to maintain this world in its present state for all the æons and eternities he can do so, and if he wishes to annihilate the whole and to let nothing remain besides Himself he can do so and

possesses the power to do so, and if he wishes to retain it in its present nature in all his parts and to change any existent thing among its parts from the course of its nature he can do so. All the miracles are of this kind, and therefore the perception of one miracle on the part of him who perceives it is a stringent proof for the creation of the world. I mean by miracle here those cases in which there appears the existence of a thing not in accordance with the habitual and permanent nature of its existence. It is of two kinds, either that a thing which has the property of being always formed by certain degrees and under certain conditions, (fol. 268 a) is formed contrary to the habitual conditions and is transformed instantly, like the transformation of the stick into a snake, of dust into lice, of water into blood, of air into fire, and the venerable holy hand (of Moses) becoming white⁽¹⁾, all of which occurred instantly. Or that a thing is produced the production of which cannot occur at all according to the nature of this established world, like the manna which was hard so that we could grind it and bake bread of it, but which melted and became liquid when the sun warmed it, together with the other miracles of the manna which are related by the Torah. All these and similar miracles then are possible, because the existence of the world in the manner in which it exists, is (a) possible (thing itself). But, according to the opinion of those who say that the world is eternal, all these things which are possible for us, are impossible for them. For him who believes in the eternity of the world, its forming cause, i. e. the cause of the existence of this entire world in its present state, is a necessary consequence of the existence of the Creator, likewise as the thing caused is the necessary consequence of the cause which is only to be found together with it, like the day being the necessary consequence of the sunrise and the shadow being the necessary consequence of an erect object, and similar cases. Whosoever holds this opinion says that movement can neither generate nor perish; therefore the heaven is, according to him, eternal, and the first matter neither generated nor (fol. 268 b) perishable, has been and will be forever without interruption in the same condition as it is; and all which differs from this natural world of generation and decay, is impossible according to

⁽¹⁾ Allusion to *Exodus*, IV, 6.

him. Therefore it is not possible, according to him, that a thing the nature of which does not imply that it be generated instantly, may be generated instantly, and that a thing the generation of which does not belong to the nature of this matter, may be generated, and that any condition among the conditions of the beings in the upper and lower world may be changed from its state. To him who understands the necessary consequences of the opinions it is evident that for him who says that the world is eternal in this manner, God has no novel will nor choice and there is no possible thing existing on which he can exert his power and will, so that, *e. g.*, he is not able to give us rain on one day and to withhold it on another day, according to his will, as the rainfall in this established nature follows the formation of the vapours and the air which bring it about or withhold it; and all this results from the formation of matter with which God cannot interfere. That is to say : he cannot bring about anything which is impossible in matter and he cannot create anything which is impossible in its modes of existence, as the matter has not been created but exists necessarily in this manner for all eternities and æons. It ought to have become clear to you (now) what is the consequence of (fol. 269 a) the opinions of those who believe in the eternity of the world and of those who believe in its creation.

There is that deviating and inexact man, Galen, who ignores most of the things about which he speaks except the medical science, who repeatedly says and declares that he is a sceptic on this point, *i. e.* the basic rule of the creation of the world, and does not know whether it is eternal or created. If only I knew how he can be a sceptic on this principle when he has built his whole discussion of the hair of the lashes and the eyebrows on the principle of the eternity of the world. Therefore he says that all which is not to be found in (the nature of) matter is impossible and that the power over it cannot be attributed to God, should he wish it one million times; he says, moreover, that the (divine) will is not sufficient unless the matter be appropriate, and further, that God is the principle for the creation of all created things, as Moses has said, in addition to the principle which resides in the matter from which they have been created. These are the words of Galen, and therefore he believes in the eternity of the world and the eternity of God alike, and that both of them are principles for the creation of all created things.

This is the belief in the eternity of the world of which Galen says that it is subject to scepticism; therefore he ought to have doubted too whether the creation of a horse from dust is possible, as Moses says, or impossible as say those who are convinced (fol. 269 *b*) of the eternity of the world. That he is a sceptic on the principle but convinced of the solution of the individual question is a proof that he is ignorant of the fact that these individual questions are derived from that principle. Likewise, his saying that there are things which are impossible to God in themselves, is an acknowledgment of the eternity of matter. The most strange thing is his saying : “As God knew that it was (the) soundest (thing) for the eyebrows not to grow long”; and his saying : “God wishes only possible things to occur, and among the possible things he only chooses the best”. (For) as to that knowledge and will and choice which are attributed to God, according to him, and as to the existence of things which are possible for God (to do) : if only I knew on which of the two basic rules he has based his saying and decided his judgment, on the belief in the eternity or on that in the creation of the world. I have explained to you that, according to the belief in the eternity of the world, there does not remain with God any will or choice and there is no possible thing in existence which God could choose or produce; but these sayings which he has uttered are correct according to the opinion that both world and matter are created.

So you must pay attention (and understand) how he confuses his words about things which are consequences of the doctrine of the creation of the world with others which are consequences of the doctrine of the eternity of the world and still thinks the whole to be one belief and one opinion, whereas he is a sceptic on the question whether the world is eternal or created. All those confused words which he has said, are according to him clear and evident, are (his) particular creed (fol. 270 *a*) and he is convinced of them. This is an obvious proof that he is ignorant of the premises and the consequences of what he is talking about and that he pays little attention to his own words. This was our aim in this chapter, and I have not endeavoured to refute those who believe in the eternity (of the world), to make them doubt and to confound them, as I have composed several expositions of these subjects in my writings on Divine Law.

رد موسى بن ميمون القرطبي على جالينوس

في الفلسفة والعلم الالهي

صححه

الدكتور يوسف شخت والدكتور ماكس مايرهوف

(ص ٢٣٩ ظ) بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر المقالة الخامسة والعشرون
(يعني من فصول موسى في الطب) تشتمل على فصول تتعلق ببعض الشكوك الحادثة
لي في كلام جالينوس

قال موسى هذه الشكوك التي أذكرها لم أقصد فيها قصد الرازي كما يتبين^(١) للتأمل
لأن الرازي لم يشكك بل أخذ أن يرد عليه في أمور لا مدخل لها في صناعة الطب
أصلاً وحتى الأمور التي تتعلق بصناعة الطب لم^(٢) يشكك عليه في استدلالاته عليها وتبين
أن هذا ليس بدليل برهاني فكأنه بين قصوره في صناعة المنطق وأيضاً فإنه يعيبه
كثيراً ويلزمه بما يلزم تجرد تلك الألفاظ مطلقاً من غير اعتبار المعنى الذي فيه يتكلم
في ذلك الموضع ، وقد عني ابن زهر وابن رضوان بحل تلك الشكوك . فإنا لم نعرض
لشيء من هذا الغرض ولا أقول أيضاً شيئاً لا فيما زعم أنه شك ولا فيما زعم أنه حل
شك إذ هذا كله عندي إتلاف (ص ٢٤٠ و) زمان بلا فائدة بل إتلافه في
الشرور لأن كل تعصب تتبع هوى في الأكثر وكل تتبع هوى^(٣) شر^(٤) محض وإنما
أذكر أنا الشكوك الواقعة لي في كلامه فيما يتعلق بصناعة الطب إذ هو إمام هذه الصناعة

(١) في الأصل : بين — (٢) ناقص من الأصل بـ (٣) في الأصل : هولا — (٤) في

الأصل : شرا

وهو الذى يقتدى به فيها ولا ينبغي أن يتبع أقواله إلا فيها لا فيها سوى ذلك وهذه الشكوك الواقعة لى لا يخلو الأمر فى سببها من أحد ثلاثة أوجه إما أن يكون ذلك من غلط وقع للذى أخرج الكتب إلى لغة العرب أو يكون ذلك من سهو وقع لجالينوس إذ لا يعصم أحداً^(١) من هذه الاعتذاريات العلو أو يكون السبب فى ذلك سوء فهمى وعلى كل حال فإن الفائدة قد حصلت بما أورده من الجمع بين القولين الموقعين ويتبين موضع الشك فيصير ذلك المعنى غرضه للتأمل فيتبين له الحق الذى يعمد عليه ولا يتشوش عليه محفوظاته ولا يتخير عند ورود الشك عليه من ذلك

(ص ٢٦٠ ظ) فصل قال موسى من المعلوم قول الفلاسفة أن للنفس صحة ومرضاً^(٢) كما للجسم صحة ومرضاً^(٣) وتلك أمراض النفس وصحتها التى يشيرون إليها هى^(٤) فى الآراء والأخلاق وهذه خصيصة بالإنسان بلا شك ولذلك أسمى أنا الآراء الغير صحيحة^(٥) والأخلاق الرديئة على كثرة اختلاف أنواعها الأمراض الانسانية ومن جملة الأمراض الانسانية مرض عام ويكاد أن لا يسلم منه إلا آحاد فى أزمنة متباعدة ويختلف ذلك المرض فى الناس بالزيادة والنقصان كسائر الأمراض الجسمية والنفسية وهذا المرض الذى أشير إليه هو تخيل كل شخص من الناس نفسه أكل مما هو عليه وكونه يزيد ويشتهى أن يحوز كل ما يعتقد كلاً من غير تعب ولا نصب ومن أجل هذا المرض العام نجد أشخاصاً^(٦) من الناس ذوى حذق ونباهة قد علموا إحدى العلوم الفلسفية النظرية والعملية^(٧) أو علماء^(٨) من العلوم الوضعية ومهروا فى ذلك العلم فيتكلم (ص ٢٦١ و) ذلك الشخص فى ذلك العلم الذى أحكمه وفى علوم أخرى لا علم له بها أصلاً أو يكون مقصراً فيها ويجعل كلامه فى تلك العلوم ككلامه فى ذلك العلم الذى مهر فيه

(١) فى الأصل : أحد — (٢) فى الأصل : ومرض — (٣) فى الأصل : ومرض — (٤) فى الأصل : وهى — (٥) كذا فى الأصل — (٦) فى الأصل : أشخاص — (٧) فى الأصل : العلمية — (٨) فى الأصل : علم

ولاسيما إن كان ذلك الشخص قد اتفقت له سعادة من السعادات المظنونة ولحظ بعين الرئاسة والتقدم وصار من أرباب الصدور يقول ويتلقى قوله بالقبول ولا يرد عليه قول ولا يعترض فيه فإن كلما تقدمت هذه السعادة المظنونة وقويت تمكن ذلك المرض واستعضل وصار ذلك الشخص يهذى مع الزمان ويقول ما عن له أن يقول بحسب خيالاته أو بحسب حالاته أو بحسب السؤالات التي ترد عليه فيجواب بما عن له إذ لا يريد أن يقول إن ثم ما لا يدريه وقد وصل استحكام هذا المرض في بعض الناس أن لم يقنع بهذا القدر بل أن يأخذ أن يحتاج ويبين أن تلك العلوم التي لا يحسنها غير مفيدة ولا حاجة إليها وأن ليس ثم علم ينبغي أن يفنى فيه العمر إلا ذلك العلم الذي يحسنه هو لا غير كان ذلك علما فلسفيا أو وضعيا وكثيرون ألفوا ردودا على علوم لا يحسنونها وبالجملة فإن هذا المرض له عرض واسع (ص ٣٦١ ظ) جداً وعند تأملك كلام الشخص بعين الانصاف يتبين لك قدر مرضه هذا وهل ذلك الشخص قريب من الصحة أو قريب من العطب . وهذا جالينوس الطيب لحقه من هذا المرض ما يلحق القوم الذين هم من قبيله في العلم وذلك أن هذا الرجل مهر في الطب جداً أكثر من كل من سمعنا خبره أو رأينا كلامه وكذلك أصاب في التشریح إصابة عظيمة وتبين له وفي زمانه لغيره أيضاً من أفعال الأعضاء ومنافعها وخلقتها ومن أحوال النبض أشياء ما كانت تبين^(١) في زمان أرسطو وهو بلا شك أعنى جالينوس ارتاض في رياضيات وقرأ منطقاً^(٢) وقرأ كتب أرسطو في الطبيعيات والالهيات لكنه مقصر في جميع ذلك ولجوذة ذهنه وذكاؤه الذي صرفه إلى الطب وكونه وجد ما عرفه هو من بعض أحوال النبض والتشریح والمنافع والأفعال أصبح مما ذكره أرسطو في كتبه بلا شك عند من ينصف فدعاه ذلك إلى الكلام في أمور وهو مقصر فيها جداً وتضارب المهرة فيها فرد على أرسطو كما علمت في المنطق ويتكلم في إلهيات وطبيعيات ككلامه^(٣) فيما يعتقده رأياً (ص ٣٦٢)

(١) في الأصل : تبين — (٢) في الأصل : منطق — (٣) في الأصل : كلام

و) لنفسه وكلامه في الحركة وفي الزمان وفي المكان وفي المحرك الأول ويأتي في جميع ذلك بما هو معلوم عند أهل هذا الشأن وانتهى به ذلك إلى أن ألف كتابه المشهور في آراء إبقراط وإفلاطون وكتاب المنى المضمنة ما تضمنته من الردود على أرسطو وكذلك ألف كتابه في البرهان وزعم أنه لا يكمل الطبيب في الطب إلا بمعرفته وأنه نافع للطبيب جداً واقتصر من المقاييس على ما يحتاج إليه في البرهان بزعمه أن^(١) تلك المقاييس هي النافعة في الطب وغيره وحذف ما سوى ذلك فكانت مقاييسه تلك التي ذكر ليست هي مقاييس البرهان أصلاً وحذف المقاييس النافعة جداً في صناعة الطب وزعم أنها لا حاجة إليها أصلاً وأن اشتغال أرسطو وغيره بها إتلاف للزمان . كل ذلك بينه أبو نصر الفارابي وذلك أنه حذف المقاييس الممكنة والمقاييس المختلطة واقتصر على المقاييس المطلقة وهي الوجودية ولم يأت به إلى أن المقاييس البرهانية هي ضرورية لا وجودية وأن الشيء النافع في الطب وفي أكثر الصنائع هي المقاييس الممكنة والمختلطة واسمع نصوص أبي (ص ٢٦٢ ظ) نصر في ذلك قال في شرحه للقياس الكبير لما أخذ أن يشرح تلك التوطئة التي وطأها للممكن وللمقاييس الممكنة : قال أبو نصر وليس الأمر في ذلك على ما ظنه جالينوس المتطبب لأنه ذكر في كتابه الذي سماه كتاب البرهان أن النظر في الممكن وفي القياسات الكائنة عنه فضل ، وأولى الناس بالنظر في القياسات الممكنة جالينوس المتطبب بل يلزمه أن يكون قد صرف أكثر عنايته في كتابه الذي^(٢) قد سماه كتاب البرهان إلى المقاييس الممكنة فانه زعم أنه صنف كتابه في البرهان لينتفع به في الطب والقياسات التي يستعملها الطبيب في استنباط صناعة الطب والقياسات التي يستعملها في تعرف الأمراض الباطنة وأسبابها في واحد واحد من الذين يقصدون علاجهم فكلها قياسات ممكنة وليس في شيء منها ضروري إلا أن يكون الشاذ الذي يكاد أن يكون خارجاً عن صناعة الطب فكذلك يلزمه ان لا يكون

(١) في الأصل : وأن — (٢) في الأصل : التي

يتكلم في كتابه الذى سماه كتاب البرهان إلا فى اشكال المقاييس الممكنة فقط دون الوجودية ، وعلى انه إن كان إنما اقتصر فى كتابه على الأشكال الوجودية ليكون قد اقتصر من (ص ٢٦٣ و) المقاييس على ما ينتفع^(١) به فى البرهان فإن الأشكال الوجودية ليست هى معدة نحو البراهين لأن البراهين ليست تعمل من هذه المادة بل إنما تعمل من الأشكال الاضطرارية فقط . انتهى كلام أبى نصر . ولما أخذ أرسطو فى تبين المقاييس المختلطة من ممكنة ومطلقة قال أبو نصر فى شرح ذلك الكلام ما هذا نصه : قال هذا الباب عظيم النفع جداً أعظم نفعاً من الممكنة الصرفة^(٢) من قبل أن^(٣) الصنائع العملية كلها تستعمل هذا الباب ولا سبب فى استنباط الأمور الجزئية المستقبلية ، هل تكون أو لا تكون ، فى الطب وفى الفلاحة والملاحة وفى تدبير المدن والخطابة والمشهورات وفى كل ما يتصرف فيه مما يحتاج فيه إلى مقدمة المعرفة ، وما فى كتاب إقراط الطيب فى مقدمة المعرفة وما شاكله من الكتب فكله ينحل إلى هذه القياسات . انتهى كلام أبى نصر فتأمل . وأعجب من كلام هذا جالينوس كونه^(٤) يطب فى مدح المنطق فى جميع كتبه ويذكر ان آفة أهل عصره من الأطباء وعلة تقصيرهم إنما هو قلة خبرتهم بالمنطق وأن (ص ٢٦٣ ظ) علة مهارته هو كونه تأدب بالمنطق ويروم دائماً أن يظهر حاجة الطيب إلى المنطق ولما ألف ذلك الكتاب ما كفى أنه لم يذكر ولا صنفاً واحداً^(٥) من أصناف المقاييس الممكنة والمختلطة التى هى فقط النافعة فى الطب إلا عند المشتغل بها وقال إنها لا يحتاج إليها أصلاً ، فلا يشك أحد أن جالينوس قرأ كتب أرسطو فى المنطق وفهما أكثر من فهم غيره ممن هو دونه لكن من أجل ذلك المرض العام الذى نحن نتكلم فيه تخيل أن فهم صناعة المنطق وسائر الصنائع النظرية كفهم صناعة الطب وأن مهارته فى تلك العلوم كلها كمهارته فى الطب فيعرض لكل ما يعرض له

(١) فى الأصل : يتدفع — (٢) فى الأصل : الصرف — (٣) ناقص من الأصل —

(٤) فى الأصل : وكونه — (٥) فى الأصل : واحد

وما وقف عند هذا الحد بل من شدة التذاده بما ظهر له من بعض منافع الأعضاء ادعى النبوة وقال إن جاءه ملك من عند الله وعلمه كذا وأمره بكذا ، فيا ليتة وقف عند هذا وكان ينظم نفسه في جملة النبيين عليهم السلام ولا يتهاوت اليهم لكنه ما فعل بل انتهى به جهله بمقدار نفسه أن قايس بين نفسه وبين موسى عليه السلام ونسب لنفسه الكمال (ص ٢٦٤ و) ونسب الجهل لموسى عليه السلام ، تعالى الله من أقاويل الجاهلين . ولذلك حسن عندي أن أسمعك كلامه بنصه ، أن محاكى الكفر ليس بكافر ، وأرد عليه ، ليس رداً^(١) على من يعرض لهذه العظيمة إذ ليس موسى عليه السلام عنده كما هو عندنا نحن معشر المشرعين بل أبين في ردى هذا أن الجهالة التي نسبها لنبينا موسى عليه السلام لا تلزمه وأن جالينوس هو الجاهل بالحقيقة وأجعل كلامي بينهما كأنى أتكلم بين شخصين عالين أحدهما الأكل من الآخر لا كمن يرجح بين كلام نبي عظيم وبين رجل متطبيب إذ هكذا هو الانصاف في معرض النظر فاقول : إن جالينوس لما أخذ أن يبين في المقالة الحادية عشرة^(٢) من منافع الأعضاء منفعة كون شعر الحاجبين لا يطول وينسبل كشعر الرأس ومنفعة كون شعر الجفنين منتصباً^(٣) ولا يطول قال كلاماً^(٤) هذا نصه قال «نقول»^(٥) إن الخالق أمر هذا الشعر أن يبقى على مقدار واحد لا يطول أكثر منه في جميع الأوقات وإن الشعر قبل ذلك الأمر وأطاع فبقى لا يخالف ما أمر به إما للفرع والخوف من المخالفة (ص ٢٦٤ ظ) لأمر الله وإما للجاملة والاستحياء من الله الذي أمره بهذا الأمر وإما الشعر نفسه يعلم أن هذا أولى به وأجمل بفعله ، أما موسى فهذا رأيه في الأشياء الطبيعية وهذا الرأي عندي أحمد وأولى أن يتمسك به من رأى أفيقورس إلا أن الأجود الضرب عنهما جميعاً والاحتفاظ بأن الله تعالى هو مبدأ خلق كل مخلوق كما قال موسى عليه السلام وزيادة المبدأ الذي من قبل المادة التي منها خلق . وإن خالفنا إنما جعل الأشفار وشعر الحاجبين يحتاج

(١) في الأصل : رد ؛ وفي الهامش زيادة : من — (٢) في الأصل : عشر — (٣) في الأصل :

منتصب — (٤) في الأصل : كلام — (٥) في الأصل : أقول :

أن يبقى على مقدار واحد من الطول لأن هذا كان أوفق وأصلح ولما علم أن هذا الشعر كان ينبغي أن^(١) يجعل على هذا جعل تحت الأشعار جرماً صلباً شبيهاً^(٢) بالعضروف يمتد في طول الجفن وفرش تحت شعر الحاجبين جلدة صلبة ملتصقة بالعضروف الحاجبين وذلك أنه لم يكن يكفى في بقاء هذا الشعر على مقدار واحد من الطول بأن يشاء الخالق أن يكون هكذا كما أنه لو شاء أن يجعل الحجر دفعة إنساناً دون أن يغير الحجر التغير^(٣) الموافق لذلك لم يكن ذلك بممكن والفرق فيما بين إيمان موسى عليه السلام وإيماننا وإيمان إفلاطون وسائر اليونانيين (ص ٢٦٥ و) هو هذا : موسى يزعم أنه يكفى بأن يشاء الله أن يزين المادة ويهيئها ليس إلا فتزين وتهيأ على المكان وذلك أنه يظن أن الأشياء كلها ممكنة عند الله وأنه لو شاء أن يخلق من الرماد فرساً أو ثوراً دفعة خلق وأما نحن فلا نعرف هذا ولكننا نقول إن من الأشياء أشياء في أنفسها غير ممكنة وهذه أشياء لا يشاء الله أصلاً أن تكون وإنما يشاء أن تكون الأشياء الممكنة ومن الممكنة لا يختار إلا أجودها وأوفقها وأفضلها ولهذا لما كان الأوفق والأصلح للأشعار وشعر الحاجبين أن يبقى على مقداره^(٤) في الطول وعلى عدده الذى هو عليه دائماً أبداً لسنا نقول في هذا الشعر إن الله إنما شاء أن يكون على ما هو عليه فصار من ساعته على ما شاء الله وذلك أنه لو شاء الله الف الف مرة أن يكون الشعر على هذا لم يكن ذلك أبداً بعد أن يجعل منشأه من جلدة رطبة إلا أنه لو لم يفرس أصول الشعر في جرم صلب لكان معاً يغير كثيراً^(٥) ما^(٥) هو عليه لا يبقى أيضاً قائماً منتصباً^(٦) ، وإذا كان هذا هكذا فإن القول أن الله جعل هذين الأمرين : أحدهما (ص ٢٦٥ ظ) اختيار أجود الحالات وأصلحها وأوفقها لما يفعل والثاني^(٧) اختيار المادة الموافقة ومن ذلك أنه لما كان الأصلح والأجود أن يكون شعر الأشعار قائماً منتصباً وأن يدوم

(١) ناقص من الأصل — (٢) في الأصل : شبيه — (٣) في الأصل : التغير — (٤) في الأصل : مقدارها — (٥-٥) في الأصل : كثير بما — (٦) في الأصل : منتصب — (٧) في الأصل : الثاني

بقاؤه على حالة واحدة في مقدار طوله وفي عدده جعل مغرس الشعر ومركزه في جسم صلب ولو أنه غرسه في جسم رخو لكان أجهل من موسى وأجهل من قائد جيش ضعيف يضع أساس سور^(١) مدينته أو حصنه على أرض رخوة غارقة بالماء وكذلك بقاء شعر الحاجبين ودوامه على حال واحدة إنما جاء من قبل اختياره للمادة» انتهى كلام جالينوس

قال موسى إذا نظر في هذا الكلام رجل متفلسف عارف بقواعد الشرائع المشهورة في زماننا تبين له اختلاط هذا الرجل فان هذا الكلام لا ينتظم كله على رأى الشرعيين ولا على رأى المتفلسفين لأن قواعد الرأيين عند جالينوس غير محصلة ولا محررة وإنما يتكلم في أمور يجهل أصولها كما أبين الآن وذلك أنه نسب لموسى عليه السلام في هذا الكلام الذى ذكرته^(٢) أربعة آراء اما رأى الواحد من الأربعة (ص ٢٦٦ و) فهو رأى موسى عليه السلام وأما الثلاثة آراء^(٣) الباقية فليست من رأى موسى وإنما جالينوس بقلة تحصيله وتحريره لكل ما يتكلم فيه خارجاً^(٤) عن الطب ظن أن الآراء الأربعة التى ذكرها رأى واحد ، وأقول أيضاً إن ذلك رأى الواحد الذى هو رأى موسى عليه السلام كما ذكر جالينوس هو فرع تابع لأصل شريعته وقاعدتها وشريعة جده ابراهيم عليهما السلام فلم تضطرب أقواله ولا تناقضت بل تثبت^(٥) أصولها وفروعها ، وإن هذا الكلام كله الذى ذكره جالينوس هنا عن نفسه وقال إن هذا إيمانه^(٦) لا يلزم أصل اعتقاده بل هذا الذى قاله لازم لاعتقاد غيره فاضطربت أقواله ولا اطردت فروعه على أصوله ، والآن أبتدىء بشرح تلك الآراء الأربعة التى نسبها إلى موسى عليه السلام في هذا الكلام أحدها وهو أولها قوله إن الله أمر شعر الحاجبين أن لا يطول فقبل منه وقال إن هذا رأى موسى في الأشياء الطبيعية ، وإن هذا ليس رأى موسى ولا يأمر الله وينهى عند موسى إلا ذا عقل ، والرأى الثانى قوله أن موسى يعتقد

(١) فى الأصل : سور — (٢) فى الأصل : ذكره — (٣) كذا فى الأصل — (٤) فى

الأصل : خارج — (٥) فى الأصل : سمع — (٦) فى الأصل : إنما

(ص ٢٦٦ ظ) أن الأشياء كلها ممكنة عند الله وهذا أيضاً ليس هو رأى موسى بل رأيه ^(١) ألا ^(٢) يوصف الله بالقدرة على الامتناعات وإنما جالينوس يُحريفه لم ينتبه لموضع الاختلاف وذلك أن ثم أشياء يقول موسى هي من قبل الممكن وغيره يقول هي من قبل الممتنع وهذا الاختلاف في تلك الأشياء فرع لازم لاختلاف وقع في الأصول وجالينوس لا يثابه لهذا ولا يعرفه لكنه يخلط ^(٣) فقط ، والرأى الثالث قوله أن موسى يعتقد أن الله لو شاء أن يخلق من الرماد فرساً أو ثوراً دفعة خلق ، هذا صحيح أنه رأى موسى وهو فرع لازم لأصل أصله كما سنبين ، والرأى الرابع قوله أن موسى يعتقد أن الله لا يختار المادة بالموافقة لكل ما يريد وجوده على صفة ما مثل ما ذكر من اختيار جسم غضروفى تحت الأشعار وموسى عليه السلام لا يخالف في هذا ومثله صرح موسى عليه السلام أن الله لا يفعل شيئاً عبثاً ولا كيف اتفق بل كل ما خلق حسناً جداً خلقه بعدل وتقسيط كما بينت فيما تكلمت به في (ص ٢٦٧ و) أصول الدين فعلم من هذه الجملة بالضرورة أن العين إنما ثقت منها الطبقة العنابية للإبصار فان العظام إنما صلبت وجففت ليصح الاعتماد عليها وكذلك كل ما في أجسام الحيوان بل كل ما في الوجود كما قال الأنبياء أتباع موسى عليه السلام إن كل ما خلق الله بحكمة صنعه وكأن جالينوس فهم هذه الواحدة من رأى موسى وهي كون الشيء دفعة على غير الجرى الطبيعى كانهقلاب العصا ثعباناً ^(٤) والتراب قملاً ^(٥) وكذلك يمكن عنده أن يصير الرماد فرساً أو ثوراً دفعة وهذا صحيح وهو رأى موسى عليه السلام وهذه كلها فروع لازمة لأصل يعتقده موسى عليه السلام وهو أن العالم محدث لأن معنى حدوث العالم هو أن الله تعالى هو القديم الأزلى وحده لا غيره معه وأنه أحدث العالم بعد عدم محض وأوجد هذه السماء وكل ما فيها وأوجد المادة الأولى دون السماء وكون منها ماء وهواء وأرضاً ^(٦) وناراً ^(٧) وطبع هذا الفلك على هذه الأدوار المختلفة كما شاء وطبع

(١) في الأصل : رأيه — (٢) في الأصل : لا — (٣) في الأصل : يخلط — (٤) في الأصل : ثعبان — (٥) في الأصل : قمل — (٦-٧) في الأصل : وأرض ونار .

هذه الاسطقات وكل ما تركب منها على هذه الطبائع التي نشاهدها إذ هو معطيا الصور التي بها صارت (ص ٣٦٧ ظ) لها طبيعة ، هذا هو أصل مذهب موسى عليه السلام ، وإذا كانت المادة الأولى عنده أوجدت بعد العلم وطبعت على ما طبعت فيجوز أن يعدمها الله موجدتها بعد أن أوجدتها وكذلك يجوز أن يغير طبيعتها وطبيعة كل شيء تركب منها ويجعل لها طبيعة غير هذه المستقرة دفعة كما أوجدتها دفعة فكذلك كل ما في طبيعة الكون والفساد تغيره ^(١) عما هو عليه عند موسى عليه السلام من باب الممكن الذي يوصف الله بالقدرة عليه ويتعلق به المشيئة : إن شاء الله تعالى إبقاء هذا العالم على ما هو عليه لدهر الداهرين وأبد الآبدين أبقاه وإن شاء أن يعدم الكل ولا يبقى سواه تعالى فعل وهو القادر على ذلك وإن شاء أن يبقيه على طبيعته في جميع جزئياته ويغير كونا ^(٢) ما من جزئيات الكون عن مجرى طبيعته فعل ، المعجزات كلها من هذا القبيل هي ولذلك تكون مشاهدة المعجزة الواحدة عند من شاهدها برهاناً قطعياً على حدث العالم أعني بالمعجزة هاهنا ما بان فيه كونه على غير طبيعة الكون المعتادة دائماً وهو نوعان ^(٣) إما أن يتكون الشيء الذي شأنه أن يتكون على تدريجات مخصوصة وبأحوال مخصوصة (ص ٣٦٨ و) دائماً على غير تلك الأحوال المعتادة بل ينقلب دفعة كاتقلاب العصا ثعباناً ^(٤) والتراب قملاً ^(٥) والماء دماً ^(٦) والهواء ناراً ^(٧) واليد الكريمة المقدسة بيضاء وكان جميع ذلك دفعة وإما أن يحدث ما ليس في طبيعة هذا الوجود المستقر أن يتكون فيه مثل ذلك الحادث أصلاً كالن الذي كان من الصلابة في حين أن نطحن ونخبز منه خبزاً وإذا حميت عليه الشمس ذاب وسال وسائر ما نهت التوراة في المن من المعجزات ، كل هذه وأشباهاها من باب الممكن إذ العالم ^(٨) كان وجوده على ما أوجد بامكان ، وأما على رأى من يقول بقدم العالم فكل هذه الممكنات عندنا

(١) في الأصل : تغيره — (٢) في الأصل : كون — (٣) في الأصل : نوعين — (٤) في الأصل : ثعبان — (٥) في الأصل : قمل — (٦) في الأصل : دم — (٧) في الأصل : نار — (٨) في الأصل : والعالم

هى عنده ممتنعة وذلك أن معتقد القدم يقول إن هذا العالم بجملته هو فاعله أى علة وجوده وهذا العالم على ما هو عليه لزم عن وجود البارئ كزوم المعلول للعللة التى لم تفارقها قط يعنى كزوم النهار عن طلوع الشمس أو لزوم الظل عن القائم وما أشبه ذلك ، فصاحب هذا رأى يقول إن الحركة غير كائنة ولا فاسدة فلذلك السماء عنده قديمة والمادة الأولى غير كائنة ولا (ص ٢٦٨ ظ) فاسدة ولم تزل ولا تزال أبداً هكذا على هذه الطبيعة وكل ما يخالف هذه طبيعة الكون والفساد فهو ممتنع عنده فلذلك فليس من الممكن عنده أن يتكون دفعة ما ليس فى طبيعته أن يتكون دفعة ولا أن يتكون ما ليس فى طبيعة هذه المادة أن يتكون ولا يتغير حالة من حالات الوجود العلوى والسفلى عما هى عليه . وبين هو عند من يفهم ما يلزم عن الآراء أن القائل بقدم العالم^(١) على هذا النحو ليس لله عنده مشيئة حادثة ولا اختيار ولا فى الوجود ممكن تتعلق به قدرته وإرادته حتى أنه مثلاً لا يقدر أن يأتينا بمطر يوماً^(٢) ما أو يمنعه يوماً^(٣) ما بحسب إرادته^(٤) إذ نزول المطر فى هذه الطبيعة المستقرة تابع لتهىء الأبخرة والهواء الموجبين له أو المانعين^(٥) منه وكل ذلك تابع^(٦) لتهىء المادة التى لا فعل لله فيها أعنى أن كل ما يعتاص فى المادة فلا يقدر أن يسهله وما يمتنع فى أكوانها لا يقدر أن يوجدده إذ ليست المادة كونت بل هكذا وجودها اللازم لها دهر الداهرين وأبد الآبدين ، فقد بان إن^(٧) شاء^(٨) الله لك ما يلزم من (ص ٢٦٩ و) الآراء لمن يعتقد قدم العالم وما يلزم لمن يعتقد حدوث العالم . وهذا جالينوس المنحرف الغير محصل^(٨) الجاهل لأكثر ما يتكلم فيه خارجاً عن صناعة الطب يقول ويصرح مرات أنه شكاك فى هذه ، قاعلة حدث العالم ، ولا يعلم هل هو قديم أو محدث فيا ليت شعرى كيف هو شكاك فى هذا الأصل وطرد قوله كله هنا فى كلامه فى شعر الأشعار والحاجبين على أصل قدم العالم ولذلك يقول إن كل ما هو معتاص فى المادة فغير ممكن ولا يوصف الله بالقدرة

(١) فى الأصل : العامل — (٢) فى الأصل : يوم — (٣) فى الأصل : يوم — (٤) فى الأصل : اراده — (٥) فى الأصل : المتابعين — (٦) فى الأصل : بالغ — (٧-٨) ناقص من الأصل — (٨) كذا فى الأصل

عليه ولو شاء ذلك ألف ألف مرة وقال إن ليس المشيئة كافية إلا أن توافق المادة وقال إن الله مبدأ خلق كل مخلوق كما قال موسى وزيادة المبدأ الذي من قبل المادة التي منها خلق ، هذا نص جالينوس فهو إذاً يعتقد قدم المادة كقدم الله وأنها مبدأ خلق كل ما خلق وهذا هو القول بقدم العالم الذي يعتقد جالينوس أن الأمر في ذلك مشكوك فيه فلذلك كان يلزمه أن يشك أيضاً هل كون الفرس من الرماد دفعة ممكن كما يقول موسى عليه السلام أو ممتنع كما يقول من يبت القضية (ص ٢٦٩ ظ) بقدم العالم فكونه شك في الأصل وبت القضية في الفرع دليل على جهله بلزوم هذا الفرع لذلك الأصل ، وكذلك قوله أن من الأشياء أشياء في أنفسها غير ممكنة عند الله هو القول بقدم المادة ، وأعجب الأمور قوله « لما علم الله أن شعر الحاجبين الأصلح له أن لا يطول » وقوله « إنما يشاء الله أن تكون الأشياء الممكنة ومن الممكنة لا يختار إلا أجودها » ياليت شعري هذا العلم والمشيئة والاختيار الذي يوصف بها الله عنده وكون في الوجود أمور^(١) ممكنة عند الله : على أي القاعدتين بني قوله هذا وبت الحكم فيه على رأى القدم أو على رأى حدث العالم وقد بينت لك أن على رأى اعتقاد قدم العالم ليس يبقى لله لا مشيئة ولا اختيار ولا ثم في الموجودات ممكن يمكنه أن يختاره أو يحدثه وإنما يصح ما قاله من^(٢) هذه الأقاويل على رأى حدث العالم وكون المادة محدثة ، فتأمل كيف يخلط في كلامه أشياء تلزم عن القول بحدث العالم مع أشياء تلزم عن القول بقدم العالم ويظن الكل اعتقاداً^(٣) واحداً ورأياً واحداً^(٣) وهل العالم قديم أو محدث مشكوك فيه عنده وكل ما قال من^(٤) هذا الكلام المختلط هو بين واضح عنده وهو الإيمان (ص ٢٧٠ و) الخاص وبت القضية فيه فهذا دليل واضح على جهله بأصول ما تكلم فيه وفروعه وقلة تأمله لما يقول وهذا كان غرضنا في هذا الفصل لا غير ولا تعرضت في هذا الفصل ولا لرد على من قال بالقدم ولا تشكيك عليه ولا تشنيع إذ قد تقدم لي في هذه الأغراض عدة أقاويل في التأليف الشرعية

(١) كذا في الأصل — (٢) في الأصل : في — (٣-٣) في لأصل : اعتقاد واحد ورأى

واحد — (٤) في الأصل : في

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